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Abstract: In a parimutuel betting system, a successful player’s return depends on the
number of other players who choose the same action. This paper examines a general
solution for two-action sequential parimutuel games, and shows how the (unique)
equilibrium of such games leads to simple pattern of behavior. In particular, we show
that there is an advantage to being an early mover, that early players might choose
actions with an ex ante low probability of success, and that player action choices can
‘flip’ with small changes in the parameters of the game.
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1.  Introduction
Many investments involve returns that are dependent on the actions of others. A
simple case is a parimutuel gambling system where bettors make a financial
investment on the outcome of a sporting event. An example is the totalizer system at
horse races where individuals place bets on horses. If their chosen horse wins, then the
return to an individual is a fractional proportion of the entire amount wagered on the
race. The return depends on both the total bets of all gamblers and the proportion who
bet on the same horse.
Parimutuel gambling systems have long been of interest to economists because they
capture important elements of more general investment decisions. They are analogous
to simplified financial markets where the scale of the pricing problem has been
reduced, with gamblers betting on horses rather than stocks and comparing odds rather
than prices.  Chadha and Quandt (1996) argue that betting markets can provide an
excellent test-bed for examining market efficiency. Parimutuel gambling systems have
also been used to test for risk attitudes and utility preferences, for example Asch,
Malkiel and Quandt (1982) and more recently Hamid, Prakash and Smyser (1996).
Much of the theoretical work analysing parimutuel systems, however, makes a critical
‘small player’ assumption that one individual cannot influence the actions of others.
In other words, there are always enough players in the system so that the effect of one
player’s actions on the information and returns of other players can be ignored. For
example, Potter and Wit (1995) examine a parimutuel system where players
independently choose actions after receiving an individual signal that is drawn from a
common distribution. But each player ignores the consequences of their action on the
odds of the gamble. Similarly, Watanabe (1997) analyses a parimutuel system with a
continuum of players.
1
                                                
1  Plott, Wit, and Yang (1997) consider various models of parimutuel betting markets, and
compare some experimental results against models.  They develop a model without the ‘small player’
assumption but are unable to solve for equilibrium in this model. Watanabe, Nonoyama, Mori (1994)
consider a finite player game but where players have mutually inconsistent beliefs.2
The small player assumption greatly simplifies the modeling of parimutuel systems,
but it is very strong. For example, if there are few players or if some players wager
relatively large sums of money then the interdependency of returns in a parimutuel
system means that the ‘small player’ assumption is likely to be violated. Further, as
has been observed in other contexts, when there is asymmetric information, the
actions of one player can result in significant information transmission that affects the
actions of other players even when returns are not directly linked. The literature on
herding and information cascades analyses this phenomenon (Banerjee (1992),
Bikhchandani, Hirscheifer, and Welch (1992, 1998), Welch (1992)).
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While much of the work in related areas has focussed on interdependency and the
transmission of information, this paper focuses on interdependency of player actions
as governed by the parimutuel form of return. We consider a simple model of a
parimutuel system where all players have identical information. This means that each
individual’s action will affect the returns of all other players by (a) increasing the size
of the prize pool and (b) raising the expected return associated with other actions. We
consider a sequence of players who must choose between two actions.  Expected
returns depend on the number of players, the actions chosen by all other players, and
an exogenous parameter such as the probability that one action is ‘correct’. Players
must determine their optimal action given their knowledge of the actions taken by all
preceding players and their expectation of the choices of all succeeding players.
Our results highlight two important features of sequential decision making. First,
players may cluster on choices, in that they will often make the same choice as the
player who immediately precedes them. Such clustering does not reflect any
information asymmetry or inference process as in the literature on information
cascades. Rather, it reflects the inability of marginal returns over actions to be
perfectly equated in a finite player game.
Secondly, players who must make relatively early action choices may choose an action
that ex ante appears to have a low expected payoff. Their decision is driven by the
rational belief that later players will cluster on the outcome that ex ante appears more
                                                
2  As the classic paper by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) points out, even if all players are price
takers, in a rational expectations equilibrium, aggregate actions by otherwise small agents can convey3
favorable. The interdependency of returns means that such clustering can result in an
ex ante more favorable action having a lower expected return ex post.
To see an example of this second phenomenon, consider a situation where three
players sequentially choose the outcome of a football game between the Bears and the
Bulls. There is a total prize pool of $100, and the ex ante probability of the Bears
winning is 60%. But returns are parimutuel, so that those players who correctly choose
the winner of the game share the prize pool equally among themselves. Then in
equilibrium, we would expect the first player to maximize his return by choosing to
back the Bulls while the second and third players support the favored Bears. Given the
first player’s choice, the second and third players individually prefer to both support
the Bears and gain an expected return of (at least) $30 rather than to back the Bulls
and receive an expected return of no more than $20. The first player, who can
accurately infer the behaviour of the other players, will back the Bulls and receive an
expected return of $40. If, in contrast, the first player had chosen to support the
favored Bears, then his expected return would only be $30 at best, as at least one of
the other players would also support the Bears. The first player maximizes his
expected return by isolating himself through his choice of the ex ante worse
alternative.
Our results can be applied to a variety of investment situations. For example, suppose
that investors sequentially choose between two towns in which to locate similar retail
stores. We should not be surprised if early investors all choose the same town and
later investors all choose the alternative location. Further, if one town has a larger
population and, as such, would appear ex ante to provide a preferred retail location,
we should not be surprised if early investors all choose to locate in the smaller town.
This behavior does not reflect any information asymmetry or market-driven herding.
Rather, it simply reflects the parimutuel form of the payoffs associated with the
investments.
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2.  The Model
N individuals sequentially choose one of two possible actions,  {} B A a , Î . Each
individual receives a payoff that depends on both the specific action that they choose
and the number of other players that have chosen the identical action. Denote the









- ) 1 (  where  p and M  are
exogenous parameters.   All players can observe the history of the game.  We wish to
examine the subgame perfect equilibria of this game.
This game can be interpreted in (at least) two ways:
Dividing a fixed monetary pool: each player knows ex ante the total payoff associated
with any action. This is given by  pMN  for action A and by (1-p)MN for action B. The
payoff to a player i from action a is equal to the total payoff associated with action a
divided by the number of players who choose that action. In other words, an
individual’s return from choosing A or B is 
n
N
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A simple parimutuel game: There exists a true state of the world W where
{ } , ab WÎ . The probability that  a W=  is p and the probability that  b W=  is 1 – p
where  [] 1 , 0 Î p . Individuals are unaware of the true state ex ante but they do know the
value of p. Action A is ‘correct’ when the true state is a , while action B is ‘correct’
when the true state isb . Each individual pays one dollar to play the game. If an
individual i chooses action A and this is the correct action then they receive a gross
return equal to 
n
N
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3.  General Results
The following two theorems apply to the model presented above. The proofs are given
in the appendix.
Theorem 1





















- ³ ) 1 ( then there is a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium where players 1,2,…,n choose A and the remainder choose
B. i.e. an equilibrium of the form AAA…AB…BBB.








- £ ) 1 ( then there is a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium where players 1,2,…,N-n choose B and the remainder
choose A. i.e. an equilibrium of the form BBB…BA…AAA.
Theorem 2



















- ¹ ) 1 ( .  Then the equilibrium defined in Theorem 1 is unique.
These two theorems show that the equilibrium outcomes of the sequential parimutuel
investment game will follow a simple pattern. The players break into two simple
groups according to their order in the sequence and their action choice. Either the first
n players will all choose action A with the remainder choosing action B, or the first
Nn -  players will all choose B with the remainder choosing A. Further the subgame
perfect equilibrium is generally unique in the sense that given a finite value of N,
multiple equilibria only exist for a finite number of values of p.
                                                
3  Note that such an n will always exist but need not be unique.6
The equilibrium involves an ‘early mover’ advantage. While the first group (either n
or N-n players) all receive the same payoff, this payoff is greater than that received by
the remainder of the players. But this advantage does not mean that early movers
choose the ex ante more likely outcome or the action associated with the ex ante larger
pool of funds. With  1
2 p > , the first players may still all choose action B in
equilibrium and receive a higher payoff than those player who choose action A.
If we interpret p as a probability, then the unique equilibrium can involve early
movers backing an extreme ‘long-shot’. For example, suppose that  0.99 p =  and
101 N = . Then the two theorems imply that the unique equilibrium involves the first
player choosing B and the remaining 100 choosing A.
The theorems show how the equilibrium behavior of the players can be very sensitive
to the parameters of the game. The addition of an extra player, for example, can cause
the equilibrium to ‘flip’ so that almost all players alter their choice. To see this,
suppose that  11
20 p = . If there are initially eight players then the unique equilibrium
outcome is for the first four players to choose action A and the remaining players to
choose action B. But if we add an extra player to the game, then the unique
equilibrium involves the first four players choosing action B while the remaining
players choose A. If the extra player moves last, then the addition of this player has led
each of the original players to change their choice.
Similarly, as p changes, the equilibrium actions will alter, following a predictable
pattern. For example, as p falls from one to one-half, successively more players will
choose action B rather than A. Further, the choice of early movers will flip between A
and B as p falls. To see this, suppose that  3 N = . It is easy to confirm that if 
3
4 (, 1 ] pÎ
then the unique equilibrium outcome involves all three players choosing A. If p falls
so that  ()
3 2
34 , pÎ then the unique outcome involves the first two players choosing A
and the last choosing B. But if p falls further, so that  ()
12
23 , pÎ then the first player
will choose B and the latter two players will choose A.7








- ) 1 (  there are 
N
n C  equilibrium outcomes. In each, n players choose action A
and () Nn -  players choose action B but all possible combinations of orderings can
arise as equilibria. For example, with  3 N =  and  2
3 p =  any outcomes where one
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NCn+1 + 
NCn equilibrium
outcomes. In equilibrium either  1 n+  players choose A and  1 Nn -- players choose B
or n players choose A and () Nn -  choose B. In either case, all possible combinations
of orderings can arise.
4.  Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed a sequential parimutuel gambling game and have
characterized the equilibria of this game. While our model is relatively simple, our
results provide insight into the behavior of other systems that involve interdependent
investment decisions. For example, our results can explain why an early retailer of a
new product might prefer to locate in a relatively small town rather than close to a
larger market, or why sequential investment decisions might appear to be
characterized by clustering subject to sudden switches in choice.
Our results do not depend on information asymmetries or inconsistent beliefs, but
simply reflect the interdependent nature of investment returns. In this sense, our
results provide a simple explanation for observed phenomenon, like clustering. This
said, the model could obviously be extended to allow for information asymmetry and
the aggregation of information as the game progresses. As noted in the literature on
information cascades, even with independent returns, sequential information
aggregation can involve significant imperfections. This will be complicated by
parimutuel returns as any cascade dilutes the return to early players. However, this
remains the topic of future research.8
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Appendix.
For the proofs of theorems 1 and 2 it is convenient to introduce the following notation.
Let  Pa h éù ëû  be the return to a player choosing action a when h players in total
choose action a.
1.    Proof of Theorem 1








- ³ ) 1 (  and the first n players
choose A, and the remainder choose B, i.e. an equilibrium of the form








- £ ) 1 (  is
analogous.)
From our parameter restrictions it is easy to show that the following inequalities hold:
PA n PB N n éù é ù ³- ëû ë û
11 PA n PB N n éù é ù +£ - - ëû ë û 11 PA n PB N n éù é ù -³ - + ëû ë û
PA n x PB N n x éù é ù +< - - ëû ë û PA n x PB N n x éù é ù -> - + ëû ë û
We now show that no player will find it desirable to unilaterally deviate from the
putative equilibrium. First, consider the players who choose A in the putative
equilibrium.  Suppose a subset of Z  of these players deviate and choose B.  From the
above inequalities, these players are only strictly better off if at least  1 Z +  players
who would have chosen B in the putative equilibrium now choose A.
Now, consider the players who choose B in the putative equilibrium.  Suppose a
subset of Z¢ of these players deviate and choose A.  From the above inequalities,
these players are only strictly better off if at least  1 Z¢+  players who would have
chosen A in the putative equilibrium now choose B.
Note that this implies that any deviations must make some players worse off than in
equilibrium as it cannot be the case that  1 Z Z¢ ³+  and  1 ZZ ¢³+  simultaneously. It
remains to show that the first player who unilaterally deviates cannot be made strictly
better off.
Let the first player deviate by choosing action a¢ rather than action a¢¢ . The first
player will only strictly gain if all the players who choose action a¢¢ are strictly worse
off. But this cannot occur. To see this, suppose the converse and consider the last
player that chooses a¢¢ . Noting that Pa h éù ëû  is decreasing in h and from the above
inequalities, this player will always gain by choosing a¢ rather than a¢¢  regardless of
the behavior of subsequent players. So this player will not choose action a¢¢  and we
have a contradiction.11
As no player in the putative equilibrium can ever strictly gain by deviating, the
putative equilibrium is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
2.   Proof of Theorem 2
The following lemmas are useful in the proof of theorem 2.
Lemma 1











.  Then, in any subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium, n players will choose A and N-n players will choose B.
Proof: From theorem 1 we know that there exists an equilibrium where n players
choose A and Nn -  players choose B. Consider any other putative equilibrium.
Suppose that in this putative equilibrium nx +  players choose A, and Nnx --
players choose B. Consider the last player that chose A and call this player i. If i
deviates and chooses B, then i is strictly better off regardless of the actions of any
subsequent players  1, , iN + K  since  1 PB N n x PA n x éù é ù --+ > + ëû ë û . Therefore i
will deviate and the putative equilibrium where more than n players choose A cannot
be an actual equilibrium.  Similarly if n-x players choose A.
Therefore, in equilibrium, n players choose A and N-n players choose B.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.
Consider any subgame of the whole game, beginning with the i
th player and any
subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this subgame given the choices of players
1, , 1 i- K . This equilibrium only depends on the number of players before i who
choose A and B, not their specific order.
Proof: This trivially follows as the payoffs for each player only depend on the number
of other players associated with each action and not their order.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2.
From lemma 1 we can restrict attention to equilibria where n players choose action A








- > ) 1 ( . From theorem 1 we know that the relevant equilibrium exists.
To show that it is unique, consider any other putative equilibrium. In this putative
equilibrium, there must exist two players, i and i+1, where i plays B and i+1 plays A.12
Consider the last such pair of players. We show that such a player i will always find it
optimal to deviate so that the putative equilibrium is not an actual equilibrium.
To see this, if i deviates and chooses A, then player i+1 chooses either B or A. Suppose
i+1 chooses B, then by lemma 2 no player  2, , iN + K  will find it desirable to deviate.
But then player i receives 
n
N





- ) 1 (  and is better off and will
therefore deviate.
Alternatively, suppose player i+1 chooses A after player i deviates. Player i+1 will












, where x is the number of players
2, , iN + K  that deviate from B to A in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium after i+1
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 and will therefore deviate.








- > ) 1 ( , and a
player i that plays B where i+1 plays A.
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Therefore, the equilibrium characterized in theorem 1 is unique.
Q.E.D.